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Part I: Introduction 
In October 2009, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in the United States reached 
10.1%, the highest it had been since December 1982 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010).  
The unemployment rate in 1982 was approximately 0.7% higher, and it had never been as 
high since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began tracking the figure in 1948.  With some 
150 Million persons in the workforce, such a figure translates to approximately 15 
Million individuals seeking but unable to find a job—a little under 4.8% of the total 
population of the United States.  Stated another way, one person in every cul-de-sac of 




In January 2010, the median sales price of a new home sold in the United States fell to 
$203,500, its lowest level since six years earlier (National Association of Realtors, 2010).  
Perhaps more importantly, in 2009 both the median and average new home sale prices 



























































High unemployment and depressed home values are only two of the symptoms of the 
economic decline which has and, as of the writing of this document, continues to impact 
the United States and, indeed, much of the world.  Foreclosures continue at an increasing 
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pace: February 2010 was the fiftieth consecutive month of year-over-year increases in 
foreclosure activities (RealtyTrac, 2010).  In the same month, in Nevada one out of every 
102 households was in some stage of default.  But the distress also reaches outside of real 
estate markets.  218 banks have failed from 2007 to February 2010, compared with only 
41 such failures in the period 1997 – 2007 (FDIC, 2010).  Automakers including General 
Motors and Chrysler, once giants of the national and world economies, have declared 
bankruptcy, along with numerous financial institutions.  Total consumer credit 
outstanding, generally considered by economists to be an indicator of consumers’ 
comfort in taking on new revolving (credit card, etc.) and non-revolving (auto loans, etc.) 
debt, steadily decreased from July 2008 to December 2009, and is seeing year-over-year 
decreases steeper than during any recession in modern history (Federal Reserve, 2010).  
Many state and local governments are at best extending furloughs to employees and, at 
worst, laying them off as tax revenues diminish.  In December 2008, a committee of the 
National Bureau of Research Economics confirmed what many had known: the U.S. 
Economy entered a recession one year earlier.  Perhaps the most notable quip 
summarizing the situation is attributed to Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner in an 
April 2009 interview: 
 
“Never before in modern times has so much of the world been simultaneously hit 
by a confluence of economic and financial turmoil such as we are now living 
through.” 
 
The nation, and indeed much of the world, is in crisis.  Thankfully, there is no dearth of 
commentary as to culprits and recommended solutions.  Media, academics, and 
politicians alike daily opine as to the depth, causes, and ramifications of the situation.  
Once technical jargon now rests on the tip of many casual observers’ tongues: 
“subprime”, “mortgage-backed securities”, “credit crunch”, “bailout”.  Sorting through 
the commentary requires true detective work, and even the evidence must be checked for 
tampering.   
 
This examination seeks to understand and explore several of the most frequently cited 
“factors” in the current economic downturn.  Specifically, the following are considered: 
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• Mortgage lending and underwriting standards 
• Homeownership, construction, population, and other macroeconomic forces 
• Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and similar securitization instruments 
• Government-sponsored enterprises 
• Agency ratings of MBS and similar instruments 
 
These factors have been thrust to the forefront of the discussion on current market 
turmoil.  This examination does not seek to place blame, but rather in two parts to 
consider correlation and causation.  In part one, each above-mentioned factor is described 
and analyzed, with specific focus on whether recent movements and changes in each, if 
any, were “historically anomalous”.  The financial and real estate crisis has certainly been 
exceptional; understanding which, if any, of these factors was simultaneously historically 
irregular will establish correlation.  In the second part, causation will be considered by 
placing the factors in sequence to the extent possible.  Finally, a conclusion summarizes 
the findings and provides suggestions for ways in which the United States and other 
similar, developed nations might avoid and address such crises in the future. 
 
Part II: Factor Description and Analysis 
Mortgage Lending and Underwriting Standards 
Perhaps none of the above-listed factors is more frequently cited as the cause of the crisis 
than lenders and their flawed underwriting standards.  In his March 13, 2008 
“Memorandum for the President”, then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson listed the 
“principal underlying causes of the turmoil in the financial markets”.  First on the list: “a 
breakdown in underwriting standards for subprime mortgages” (Paulson, 2008). 
 
In the single family market, mortgage lending is heavily reliant on borrowers’ credit 
history, ability to make monthly payments of principal and / or interest, and down 
payment capabilities.  As these factors are scaled, defining “prime” and, therefore, 
“subprime” borrowers and lenders can be difficult.  Commentators have adapted an initial 
distinction between loans as either “conforming” and “nonconforming”.  Conforming 
loans are those that are eligible for purchase by the government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because of their loan size and other underwriting 
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criteria (Chomsisengphet, 2006).  It is worthwhile to note that very basic categorical 
definitions and distinctions in single family lending reference the GSEs.  This 
demonstrates the interconnectedness of securitization and the GSEs to real estate lending. 
 
Within the nonconforming category, loans may be further classified as “jumbo”, “Alt-A”, 
and subprime.  Jumbo loans are those that are otherwise typically conforming, but are in 
amounts higher than allowed under GSE guidelines.  So-called “Alt-A” mortgages are 
considered more risky than prime (conforming) mortgages, but less risky than subprime 
mortgages.  They are typically characterized by borrowers with less than full income or 
employment documentation, average or slightly below-average credit scores, higher loan-
to-value ratios, and more investment properties (Fabozzi, 2001).  Subprime loans are 
made to borrowers with the highest credit risk, and are especially distinguished by 
increased borrowing costs, both in upfront fees and ongoing loan costs (Chomsisengphet, 
2006).  Beyond these two basic characteristics—lower borrower credit scores and higher 
loan costs—the precise definition of “subprime” is elusive.  As Sengupta and Emmons  
(2007) note, “the prime-subprime distinction is not clear-cut and there is still some 
confusion regarding a precise characterization of subprime lending”.  Nonetheless, 
subprime has, at least in recent years, come to mean loans made to borrowers who cannot 
otherwise obtain a conventional mortgage, usually due to impaired or absent credit 
history, perhaps including a recent bankruptcy or foreclosure. 
 
Subprime lending is a relatively recent historical phenomenon, having been effectively 
birthed in two laws passed in 1980 and 1982 (Chomsisengphet, 2006).  The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (1980) preempted state interest rate 
caps, and the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Party Act (1982) permitted the use of 
variable interest rates and balloon payments.  Such practices had been discouraged and 
even outlawed in the years prior so as to encourage increased long-term investment in 
homeownership in the period following the Great Depression.  Strict regulation by state 
and federal government over lending practices was replaced with federal disclosure laws, 
introducing a “buyer beware” atmosphere which did not exist prior to 1980 (McCoy, 
2008).  However, given that securitization would not experience its advent until a decade 
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later, most lenders underwrote their loan applications by hand and held their home 
mortgages in portfolios.  This had the dual effect of decreasing funds available for 
lending and increasing lenders’ requirements for only the most credit-worthy customers 
who were least likely to default.  
 
Deregulation in 1980 and 1982 was accompanied by technological advances in lending.  
Specifically, McCoy and Renuart (2008) describe how the introduction of statistical 
credit scoring models and automated underwriting “made it possible to price disparate 
credit risks, opening up credit to people who had previously been deemed unqualified for 
loans.  Statistical modeling gave underwriting professionals a sense of comfort that 
traditional underwriting requirements could be abandoned without significantly affecting 
default rates. 
 
If federal deregulation and technological advances set the stage for subprime and 
nonconforming lending, the curtain rose, so to speak, with the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 
1986.  It is noteworthy that the 1986 TRA in large measure placed new limitations on the 
amount of home mortgage interest which could be deducted from personal taxes.  For 
example, home mortgage became limited to a buyer’s first two residences, where 
previously any number of residences could have benefited from the deduction.  But the 
element of the 1986 TRA which most influenced the current financial crisis is the 
elimination of interest deduction for personal interest with maintenance of the 
deduction—albeit scaled back—for mortgage interest.  This in essence created tax 
distortions between homeowners and renters (Jackson, 2008).  These distortions, 
translated into financial betterment for the class of consumers able to purchase, began a 
strong trend among Americans toward homeownership as the preferred housing 
alternative, which would be embraced and encouraged by politicians and financiers alike. 
 
Economic expansion in the early 1990s saw growth in home values and some of the 
lowest interest rates in four decades.  Responding to their increased purchase power and 
the desire to become homeowners, consumers increased their debt via home loans and 
home equity lines of credit.  Competition in the lending markets increased.  In response, 
  8
lenders expanded the use of all loan products, including subprime and nonconforming.  In 
addition, the growth in both agency- and private-issued mortgage backed securities, and 
the willingness of investors to buy those securities, represented “an endorsement of the 
[subprime] product segment, and an impetus for expansion ” (Goliath, 2006).  The 
historical growth of securitization is considered in greater depth later in this part. 
 
The total amount of subprime loans originated grew significantly throughout the mid-
1990s.  In 1994 subprime lending totaled approximately $35 billion, a little over 5% of 
all new mortgage originations.  By 1997 that figure would grow to $125 Billion, roughly 
14.5% of all new home originations (McCoy, 2008).  However, as interest rates dropped 
from 1997 through the end of the decade, the percentage of total originations which were 
subprime decreased back to a low point of 8.2% in 2001 (Chomsisengphet, 2006).  This 
interplay with mortgage rates demonstrates a dangerous double-sidedness which 
subprime loans carry: as economic conditions improve, and accordingly the financial 
welfare of borrowers, they look to refinance into prime loans to lower their interest rates.  
However, subprime mortgages generally carry prepayment penalties, representing 
negative consequences for both buyer, lender, and MBS investor.  On the other hand, 
when general economic conditions worsen, real estate values drop, and subprime 
borrowers lose their jobs in a market of increasing interest rates, they often face 
foreclosure, adjusting rates, ballooning principals, and other such difficulties.   
 
Following the burst of the technology bubble in the early years of the new century, single 
family loan origination of all types accelerated exponentially, and the subprime category 
was no exception.  In May of 2000, the Federal Funds rate—the rate established by the 
Federal Reserve which banks charge one another for overnight lending—was 6.50%.  
Starting in 2001, in an effort to ward off recession, the Federal Reserve repeatedly 
slashed the rate to an historic low of 1.00% in 2003.  The average 30-year fixed mortgage 
rate followed suit, dropping from 8.52% to 5.23% over the same period.  Total loan 
originations soared from $1.048 trillion in 2000 to $3.0 trillion in 2006.  Perhaps more 
importantly, nonconforming loans (including subprime, Alt-A, and jumbo loans) grew 
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from comprising 29.8% of those originations in 2001 to 49.6% in 2006.  Subprime 
mortgages alone accounted for 20.1% of all new originations by 2006. 
 
Growth in subprime lending spurred some calls for re-regulation by the federal 
government.  In 1994 Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA), which “prohibits certain predatory lending practices in the costliest subprime 
loans” (McCoy).  HOEPA was widely regarded as narrow in scope; as of 2002, HOEPA 
applied to only one percent of all subprime loans.  In the absence of more significant 
federal involvement, states acted.  As of 2007 twenty-nine states and Washington D.C. 
had enacted HOEPA-like statutes, and all but six states regulated some number of 
subprime loan terms (McCoy).  However State laws were largely preempted by federal 
regulations, the most notable of which were regulations passed by the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) in 1996 and by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in 2004.  
As McCoy and Renuart note, “these pronouncements permit national banks and federal 
saving associations to ignore a whole host of state credit protection laws.”  In addition to 
exempting these agencies, the OTS and OCC regulations failed to put in place any 
comparable federal regulations, effectively creating a regulatory vacuum for federally 
chartered banks.  The involvement of these federal agencies also created a dual regulatory 
system, where certain lending institutions are governed by certain state laws, while 
others—and even subsidiaries of the former—are governed by federal law.  The unlevel 
playing field, combined with weak regulation, contributed to the explosion of subprime 
and lending. 
 
Certainly that more lenders were making more subprime loans overall is evidence that a 
segment of borrowers not previously either desiring or capable of accessing mortgage 
credit was now finding a way.  But real estate values were also rising, and it is therefore 
worthwhile to consider that benchmark ratios including loan-to-value could more easily 
be met during the heyday of subprime origination.  The general consensus remains, 
however, that underwriting standards, especially for adjustable rate mortgages, were 
generally exploited as much as legally possible (and in some cases, illegally) between late 
2004 and early 2007 to maintain a supply of qualified buyers for an increasing number of 
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subprime lenders (Paulson, 2008).  In late 2006, “the first waive of risky ARMs made in 
2004 and 2005 came due, and the house of cards fell apart” (McCoy, 2008).  Foreclosures 
jumped from 750,000 in 2005 to nearly 1 Million in 2006 to more than 1.5 Million in 
2007 (Federal National Mortgage Corporation).  Upon recognition of the increasing 
number of defaults, banks tightened credit, just as home values were leveling off due to 
overbuilding (which is discussed in depth later).  Subprime borrowers, especially those 
with adjustable rate mortgages initiated in 2004 and 2005, faced a mortgage marketplace 
with few options.  As a result, defaults and foreclosures continued upward as 
homeowners failed to make payments.  At current, some 28.7% of subprime loans are 90 
days or more delinquent or in foreclosure, and even prime loans are defaulting at rates 
significantly higher than in any previous business cycle since the 1930s (Federal National 
Mortgage Corporation).  Subprime lending has dried up, with subprime mortgages 
representing only 1.5% of all loan originations in 2008. 
 
This segment of analysis seeks to determine if the changes in certain financial and real 
estate-related factors in the years leading up to the financial crisis were historically 
anomalous.  A cursory review of recent lending history indicates that for prime lenders, 
underwriting standards have not changed significantly in the years prior to 2007.  This is 
a worthwhile but oft unmentioned point.  The underwriting in question, then, was specific 
to the subprime portion of loan originations.  As the above details have revealed, 
regulation from the federal and state governments with regard to underwriting standards 
for subprime mortgages consisted mainly of maximum limitations.  Within a wide 
spectrum of available lending term options, lenders established underwriting standards 
largely at their own whim.  Furthermore, an historical analysis is difficult to conduct with 
subprime lending because its birth is so recent.  Subprime lending in essence did not exist 
prior to 1993.  Since then it has experienced a profound boom and bust, but that boom 
and bust cannot be considered on any historical scale.  Only time will tell if subprime 
lending ever returns to the levels it reached in the mid-2000s, or if the recent, violent 




Homeownership, construction, population changes, and other macroeconomic forces 













































The chart shown above may seem innocuous enough.  However it belies one of the most 
notable patterns of the U.S. economy in the years leading up to the financial crisis and 
2007 recession.  The two dotted, vertical purple lines are meant to highlight a particularly 
noteworthy segment of the chart.  During this period, as can be seen, the homeownership 
rate in the United States increased relatively rapidly, from 63.89% in 1985 to 68.88% in 
2005.  During this same time, the growth rate of households in the U.S. remained 
relatively constant, averaging approximately 2.77%.  That homeownership rates 
increased faster than household growth indicates that a portion of the pool of new owner 
households was not households newly created (by marriage, etc) but existing households 
converting to ownership.  This further substantiates the concept that buyers previously 
unable to own were finding a way.  Wheaton and Nechayev found that in the period 
between 1995 and 2005 the number of renters in the U.S. actually declined for the first 




Data indicates that both new and existing home sales increased in the period leading up to 
2006 and 2007.  Even more drastically, private housing units authorized by permit 





























Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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Median Home Sales Price
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New homes alone were being constructed at a faster rate than households were growing, 
and the inventory of housing units increased accordingly.  In October 2005 the Single 
Family Housing Monitor summarized the situation as follows: 
 
Housing activity continues to tread at a high level, although signs of slowing are 
mounting.  Inventories are rising rapidly.  The near record pace of construction is 
outstripping new demand in the nation’s single-family housing market. The accumulation 
of oversupply is stable, however, with the months of excess supply hanging around 2.4 
months for the last year. The supply buildup poses a downside risk for housing’s outlook. 
Should the extraordinary factors that have been keeping housing markets roaring retreat 
sharply, they will leave exposed the weak underlying supply-demand balance trends. 
 
Unfortunately, it seems few residential and commercial builders were listening.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, the cost of new homes far outstripped the income of the 
average American consumer.  The below graph evidences two separate but equally 
important realities.  The first is the extent to which housing prices climbed in relation to 
median income in the years leading up to 2007 and 2008.  As Klyuev (2008) writes, “it is 
widely recognized that by the mid-2000s home prices had reached levels not supported 
by fundamentals”.  Whereas median household income increased 1.87% on average from 
1995 to 2005, median home prices averaged a 10.44% year-over-year growth rate during 
the same period.  To some, the wild increase in prices was clearly unsustainable. 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; National Association of Realtors, Author. 
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Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) summarize as follows: 
 
“With certainty, average housing prices [over the period 1975 – 1998] grew in line with 
income.  Since 1998, however, prices have risen almost 50% while incomes increased only 
5% and 11%.  These last eight years have indeed been remarkable.” 
 
The second aspect of the chart worth noting is the contrast of the increase in home sales 
prices in recent years to other real estate cycles in modern history.  Around 1980 and 
1990, home prices reached new highs (for the time), then dropped severely.  In the case 
of the 1990 “bubble”, one commentator noted a “brief era of gloom and doom” was 
ushered in.  Yet the magnitude of these cycles is grossly insignificant when compared to 
the differential between trough and apex of the current cycle. 
 
One other important economic fundamental to consider is the growth in second and 
investment home buying.  Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) analyze this market by 
examining loan origination records where the buyer must, by law, declare whether the 
financing is for purchase of a primary home or other.  They conclude that the sum of 
investor and second home origination as a percentage of all originations increased sharply 
from approximately 8% in 1999 to 17% in 2005.  Expectedly, the growth was even more 
dramatic in markets like Atlantic City, NJ and coastal regions in Florida.  Wheaton and 
Nechayev speculate as to the reasons for such growth: early retirement of the so-called 
“baby boomer” generation; the market’s view of real estate as a relatively stable asset 
class compared with stocks, which slid in value after the 2000 dot com bust, etc.  But for 
the purposes of this analysis, it is worthwhile simply to note the increase in activity. 
 
This part of the analysis seeks to determine whether variation, if any, in the five listed 
factors was “historically anomalous” in the years leading up to the recent recession.  With 
regard to several macroeconomic factors, including new construction starts and sales, 
housing prices, and consumer spending, the above analysis indicates that pre-recession 
trends truly were historically significant.  In other words, the 2005-era bubble of real 
estate as an asset class was significantly more severe than comparable historical housing 




The mortgage market can be separated into primary and secondary components.  Primary 
market lenders provide actual loans to borrowers, whereas the secondary market channels 
liquidity into the primary market by way of purchasing the loans, or packaging the loans, 
from the initial lenders.  From the initiation of the modern mortgage market in the wake 
of the Great Depression through the late 1960s, mortgage loans made in the primary 
market were either held by the lending institutions or, infrequently, traded as whole loans 
(unsecuritized mortgages).  Such lending practices decreased liquidity of the primary 
lenders, and in essence capped the size of the primary mortgage market.   
 
The Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), consisting of the Government National 
Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”), and the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”), are 
closely tied to the development of mortgage-backed securities.  In 1968, Congress 
established Ginnie Mae with the express intent of increasing liquidity in the primary 
mortgage market.  Ginnie Mae pioneered the use of mortgage pass-through securities, in 
which primary mortgages are pooled and used as collateral for the issuance of securities 
in the secondary market.  Mortgage pass-through securities represent a simpler version of 
their more modern cousin, Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS).  MBS may securitize 
Residential (RMBS) or Commercial (CMBS) loans.  Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) are 
a category of security backed by any consumer-related product (for instance, credit car 
loans or credit card debt).  Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) are those securities 
backed by consumer debt obligations.  There are further distinctions between MBS, ABS, 
and CDO but for the purposes of this analysis the above “rule-of-thumb” distinctions will 
suffice, and MBS is the focus of discussion. 
 
Ginnie Mae does not buy or sell loans or issue MBS; instead it guarantees payments on 
MBSs that are backed by federally insured or guaranteed loans.  Ginnie Mae first 
guaranteed a pool of loans in 1970, followed by Freddie Mac in 1971, and Fannie Mae in 
1981 (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).  By selling the primary mortgages to 
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investors, who in turn benefit from the flow of principal and interest payments over the 
duration of the loan, primary lenders recognize immediate capital replacement, enabling 
them to initiate new primary loans.  The virtues of securitization are widely extolled, 
though perhaps less so now than before 2007.  Primarily, the securitization process 
provides liquidity to primary lenders while allowing them to pass interest rate risk on to a 
broad array of investors.   
 
Since its inception in the late 1960s, the securitization market has grown tremendously.  
A government task force formed in 2002 to conduct a study of the MBS market notes it 
grew some 800% between 1983 and 2003.  As of June 2009, of public and private bond 
debt totaling $34.3 Trillion, mortgage-backed securities comprised $8.9 Trillion, or 
roughly 26%: the single largest fixed-income sector (Federal National Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation).  Most notable is not the mere fact that MBS issuance was 
growing in the years leading up to 2007, but that the portion of originations packaged into 
securities was also increasing, growing from nearly 0% of all originations in the late 
1980s to nearly 62% of all originations in 2001, to 77% of all originations in 2006 
(Federal National Mortgage Corporation).   During its growth, the industry has 
introduced new products including Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) and 
stripped MBS.  The exploration of these instruments is beyond the scope of this analysis, 
but it is worthwhile to note that many such products were created to match investors 
tolerant of greater risk to products offering greater reward (higher yields). 
 
Perhaps the most notable growth in MBS markets was in the total issued by non-agency 
entities (i.e. not by the three GSEs mentioned above).  The first so-called “private label” 
MBS was issued in 1977 by Bank of America, however there was little activity in the 
private MBS market until the early 1980s.  Many of the regulatory constraints affecting 
private entities were removed in 1984 with the enactment of the Secondary Mortgage 
Market Enhancement Act.  Private participation was further encouraged with the passage 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated a double taxation issue which had 
previously hindered the abilities of private MBS issuers, and in so doing gave rise to Real 










































through security structure whereas non-agency issuers favor REMICs.  Non-agency MBS 
issuance grew from slightly under $2 Billion in 1985 to almost $7 Billion in 1986.  From 
1986 through 1993 the industry continued exponential growth, peaking in 1993 at nearly 
$100 Billion.  As can be seen in the below chart, however, this growth was nothing 
compared to what would happen next.  After sliding back to nearly $50 Billion in 1995, 
non-agency MBS issuance would grow to $203 Billion in 1998, slowing to $135 Billion 
in 2000 before skyrocketing to nearly $1.2 Trillion in 2005.  The growth between 2000 
and 2005 alone represented a 776.2% growth rate. 
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. 
 
Agency MBS experienced growth in the same periods, but with far less volatility.  To 
wit, in the period between 1985 and 1997, agency issuance averaged $359 Billion, with 
eight year-over-year increases and seven year-over-year decreases during the fifteen year 
period.   Between 2000 and 2003 the agency portion of MBS issuance did see tremendous 
growth, from nearly $479 Billion to over $1 Trillion, a 345% increase.  However, just 
two years later, in 2005, over half of that growth was lost.  In 2005, non-agency MBS 
issuance surpassed agency issuance for the first time in history. 
 
The above discussion indicates that securitization of mortgages on the whole grew greatly 
from 1990 to current, and that non-agency securitization grew exponentially faster than 
agency securitization in the years leading up to 2007.  One last point worthy of note is the 
tremendous growth in the securitization of subprime loans in particular.  Inside Mortgage 
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Finance notes that subprime MBS issuance comprised approximately $20 Billion in 1995, 
less than half of all non-agency MBS issued.  In three years that figure would more than 
triple, to approximately $75 Billion.  Such growth, though rapid, was reflective of the 
overall growth in non-agency MBS.  After slight decreases in the end of the 1990s, the 
amount of subprime non-agency issuance would jump from $50 Billion in 2000 to over 
$450 Billion in 2005.  Similarly, the FDIC reports that Alt-A loans comprised 1% of all 
non-agency MBS in 1995 and 26% in 2005.  Starting in 2004 and continuing for the next 
three years, the portion of non-agency MBS collateralized by subprime loans was greater 
than that collateralized by prime loans.  In short, MBS investors were buying more non-
agency MBS, and a greater portion of their investment was made up of subprime loans.  
It is worthwhile to note that by 2008, the non-agency MBS market had all but 
disappeared, decreasing to approximately 2.4% of total MBS issuance. 
 
One might suspect that as MBS investors—largely institutional—sank billions into riskier 
(subprime) loans which comprised an increasing portion of the comparatively riskier non-
agency MBS market, the investors would look to hedge their increased risk accordingly.  
Credit enhancement provides the primary means of risk management in non-agency 
MBS.  In the late 1980s, credit enhancement had been accomplished largely through 
corporate guarantees, letters of credit, excess interest charges, or insurance.  These 
methods are considered “external” credit enhancement, because they are “outside” the 
actual security.  However, as MBS markets grew through the 1990s, these external credit 
enhancements were increasingly replaced with “internal” methodologies including 
overcollateralization, excess spread, and (especially) subordination.  Overcollateralization 
refers to the value of the collateral being larger than the security which it backs.  Excess 
spread likewise occurs when the coupon on the issued security is less than the interest 
rate received on the underlying collateral.  In subordination, the debt instrument is 
separated into tranches, with a senior tranche and one or more subordinated tranches.  If 
the pool defaults, the subordinated tranches incur first loss, thereby protecting the senior 
tranche.  That the senior position holders were first to receive payment meant that they 
were paid the lowest interest rate.  Investors in the most junior tranche—often known as 
the “equity piece” or “first loss position”— were rewarded for their riskier investment 
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with higher interest payments.  As the non-agency securitization market churned out 
cash, many issuers (both agencies and non-agencies) noted the success, and many 
purposefully kept the junior tranche for themselves, marketing to investors that they were 
maintaining “skin in the game’.  The listing below, excerpted from the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission’s April 2010 report on Securitization and the Mortgage Crisis, 
shows the top 10 non-agency issuers in 2007, many of whom maintained the “equity 




These 10 issuers accounted for 56% of all non-agency MBS issuance in 2007.  Asterisks 
in the above table denote firms which have been acquired since 2007, while crosses 
indicate firms which have subsequently declared bankruptcy.  
 
This part of this analysis seeks to understand the extent to which activity in the mortgage-
backed securities market was “historically anomalous” in the years leading up to 2007.  
Much like subprime lending, the MBS market suffers from a short history against which 
to judge.  It is worthwhile to summarize however that the agency MBS market 
experienced nearly thirty years of stability from its inception in the late 1960s through its 
overheating in the early 2000s.  The non-agency MBS market, younger and less 
regulated, experienced truly unbelievable growth in the early part of the new century 
which, even compared with its limited history, was unusual.  Lastly, more notable than 
the overall growth of agency and non-agency MBS markets was the increasing presence 
of subprime loans in the collateral comprising these MBS, and the simultaneous steadily 
decreasing subordination levels required by the rating agencies.  Securitization, which 
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had been used in years prior nearly exclusively for prime mortgages by the GSEs, with 
generally positive results for lenders, investors, and homeowners alike, was increasingly 
being utilized for lower quality mortgages by non-agency institutions (Valukas, 2010). 
 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) was initially formed as a 
wholly-owned government corporation—a federal agency—in 1938.  Thirty years later, 
the Johnson Administration bifurcated the agency into two separate organizations.  The 
new Fannie Mae became a Government Sponsored Enterprise, or GSE: a publically 
traded, for-profit, non-government organization whose operations were removed from the 
federal budget.  GSEs are different from typical corporations, among other ways, in that 
they are limited to carry out the business activities authorized by their charters.  The 
second organization formed in the bifurcation was Ginnie Mae, which remained within 
the U.S. Department of HUD, and whose operations are reflected on the federal budget.  
In 1970, Congress chartered Freddie Mac to serve generally the same purpose as Fannie 
Mae, and also authorized both Fannie and Freddie to expand their purchases to 
conventional (non-federally insured) mortgages up to a specific amount.  Ginnie Mae was 
not authorized to purchase conventional mortgages or to maintain a portfolio of its own.  
The two GSEs initially held mortgages on their own balance sheets, but by 1981 both 
Fannie and Freddie were securitizing most of the loans they purchased.  It is important to 
note that, until September of 2008, an important difference between Fannie and Freddie 
and Ginnie was that Ginnie was backed by the “full faith and credit” of the U.S. 
Governments, in other words the U.S. Government guaranteed payments to investors.  
Such guarantee did not exist for Fannie and Freddie. 
 
In 1992 Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and 
Soundness Act which authorized the Secretary of HUD to set affordable housing goals 
for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The legislation mandated that a certain percentage of 
loans purchased by the GSEs had to be written in certain areas, where growth in 
affordability of homeownership was an objective.  The Act also created the Office of 













































responsibility for ensuring that Fannie and Freddie were adequately capitalized and 
operating safely.  OFHEO was required to have its budget approved by Congress every 
year, contrasting with the agencies that regulate banks, which set their own budgets. 
 
While the agencies’ historical participation in MBS markets indicates nominal growth 
consistent with the overall MBS industry, it also reveals lost market share in the years 
leading up to the current financial crisis.  In 1983, with a total MBS market of 
approximately $242 Billion, the agencies issued 100% of all MBS.  Of this, Ginnie Mae 
represented approximately 65%, Freddie Mac approximately 24%, and Fannie Mae the 
remaining 11%.  By 1990, agency MBS issuance would shrink to comprise 95% of all 
originations, with Ginnie, Freddie, and Fannie at 40%, 31%, and 29%, respectively, of all 
agency issuance.  By 2003, agency issuance receded further, comprising a mere 84% of 
all MBS issuance.  By 2005, that figure would shrink to 74%, with Ginnie, Freddie, and 
Fannie comprising 11%, 32%, and 57% of agency issuance, respectively.  This data  
reveals both the explosive growth in non-agency MBS which was discussed in the 
previous section, but also the relatively steady involvement of Ginnie and, to a lesser 
extent, Freddie, compared with expansion of Fannie’s agency proportion. 
 
Source: Inside MBS and ABS; UBS, Author. 
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Explosive MBS investment growth and market share loss are not the only notable 
elements in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s history in the years leading up to the financial 
crisis.  The relationship between the agencies, their regulator, and Congress is speckled 
with conflicts and questionable outcomes, ever the more so in hindsight.  As the 
companies grew their business in the 1990s, competitors and politicians alike became 
increasingly concerned about the risk their failure might have on the housing and finance 
systems.  In 1999, Treasury Secretary Larry Summers quipped that “debates about 
systemic risk should also now include the government sponsored enterprises”.  
Treasury’s Undersecretary for Housing commented that the agencies’ lines of credit with 
Treasury should perhaps be reconsidered.  In 2002, accountants and investors became 
suspicious that the agencies were putting billions in derivatives losses on their balance 
sheet instead of their income statements, and thusly overstating profits.  In the wake of 
the Enron scandal, after Freddie fired its longtime accounting firm Arthur Anderson, the 
company admitted to smoothing out earnings for several years.  Soon after, in 2003, the 
Bush Administration provided OFHEO funding with which to hire Deloitte & Touche to 
conduct an investigation of Fannie Mae’s accounting.  That same year, Representative 
Richard Baker, a Republican from Louisiana, introduced a bill which would have 
stiffened regulation of Fannie and Freddie.  Among other things, the bill proposed to 
abolish OFHEO in lieu of a new regulator, whose budget would be set not from 
congressional appropriations, but fees levied directly on the GSEs, in amounts 
determined by the new regulator.  The bill eventually failed.  In September OFHEO, 
utilizing Deloitte’s services, published a report accusing Fannie Mae of numerous 
accounting mistakes, including deferring expenses so as to report a higher price per share, 
and pay out executive bonuses dependent on such figures.  Hearings were held in 
Congress to investigate the report, and to label these as politically energized would be an 
understatement.  Republicans largely noted concern over the agencies’ accounting and 
lauded the report; Democrats protested the need for hearings.  Representative Maxine 
Waters, Democrat from California, noted: 
 
“Under the outstanding leadership of Mr. Frank Raines, everything in the 1992 Act has 
worked just fine.  In fact, the GSEs have exceeded their housing goals.  What we need to 
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do today is focus on the regulator, and this must be done in a manner so as not to impede 
[the GSEs’] affordable housing mission.” 
 
In an unusual move, the then-Fannie CEO Frank Raines requested a follow-up 
investigation by the SEC to dispute the OFHEO report.  In December 2002 the SEC 
announced that it had determined Fannie Mae’s accounting did not comply “in material 
aspects”, and that its earnings would have to be restated.  Raines resigned 8 days later. 
 
In the wake of their accounting scandal, under the leadership of new CEO Daniel Mudd, 
Fannie—and Freddie, to a lesser degree—entered a period of heightened scrutiny.  That 
scrutiny took two important forms: (1) concern over their financial safety and soundness 
and (2) pressure to perform the “mission”.  Opining on the first of these, in 2004, the 
usually-tempered Alan Greenspan commented that “to fend off future systemic 
difficulties, which we assess as likely if GSE expansion continues unabated, preventative 
actions are required sooner rather than later."  In late January 2005, Republican Senators 
introduced the “Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act”, which would have 
established an office with regulatory powers over Fannie, Freddie, and the Federal Home 
Loan Bank system.  But the bill met with resistance, and was not passed.  Regarding the 
second form of scrutiny—pressure to perform the “mission”—the Bush administration, 
under the leadership of then HUD Secretary Alphonso Jackson, increased the GSEs 
affordable housing goals repeatedly.  In 2006, HUD Assistant Secretary Brian 
Montgomery presented Congress with the FHA Modernization Act, which would “enable 
FHA to reach deeper into the pool of prospective borrowers”, and eliminate FHA’s 3% 
down payment requirement, “reducing a significant barrier to homeownership”.  Though 
FHA’s business is not identical to that of the GSEs, the overall message from government 
was being made clear: more people should own homes.  The FHA bill was passed in the 
House, but did not clear the Senate.  Similar measures and statements continued in 2006 
and 2007. 
 
As housing prices cooled, and the effect of collateralized subprime mortgages became 
apparent, Fannie and Freddie began an ironic new two-pronged role.  They were losing 
tremendous money, while nonetheless remaining vital to the U.S. housing market as the 
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non-agency market disappeared.  A Congressional Research Service reports notes that 
had the GSEs been private companies, they may have failed completely by mid-2008.  
Yet they continued to be able to fund their deficits by issuing bonds which the market 
bought, likely because it had come to rely on the implicit guarantee of the federal 
government to support the institutions in times of trouble.  Several research articles note 
the historical precedent for that implicit guarantee based on the government’s bailout of 
the troubled Farm Credit System in the late 1980s, but a discussion of that incident is 
beyond the scope of this analysis.  Despite the implicit guarantee, Fannie and Freddie’s 
share prices dropped so catastrophically—over 60% for both firms—that in mid-2008 
their ability to access credit became questionable.  On September 7, 2008, the GSEs were 
placed into conservatorship: legally directed and controlled by the U.S. Government.  
The implicit guarantee had become actual. 
 
This section of analysis attempts to determine if the history of the GSEs in the period 
prior to the financial meltdown was anomalous.  The above research indicates that was 
largely the case.  Fannie and Freddie were increasing losing market share compared to 
historical benchmarks and yet were under increased pressure from Washington to 
perform.  Their purchase and resale of increasing amounts of non-prime mortgages 
represented a deviation from previous practices.  And their inability to access capital 
through the stock market represented a questioning of the agencies’ very ability to exist, 
and would eventually necessitate government involvement. 
 
Rating Agencies 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are private companies which measure and rank the credit 
worthiness of certain organizations or financial products.  Over 100 CRAs exist, but 
three—Moody’s, Standard & Poor, and Fitch—control 95% of the industry.  The CRAs 
rate a variety of structured finance products, including MBS—both Residential (RMBS) 
and Commercial (CMBS)—and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs).  As discussed 
above, securitization issuances are separated into different tiers of risk, which then carry 
different yield expectations.  Each tranche is rated by a credit rating agency.  The credit 
rating indicates the CRA’s view as to the creditworthiness of the debt in the MBS, in 
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other words the likelihood that the issuer will fail to meet its obligation to make (pass 
through) principal and interest payments to the debt purchaser.  The CRAs are generally 
provided information on the underlying mortgages and assets such as terms, geographical 
location, credit history and credit score of the borrower, the loan’s lien position, etc.  A 
CRA analyst determines the likelihood that the underlying borrowers will default given 
stresses of varying severity.  The rating agencies publish their decisions and are typically 
paid only if the credit rating is issued. 
 
As the below graphic indicates, the years leading up to the financial crisis saw significant 
growth in the workload, staff levels, and revenues of all three major CRAs. 
 
Source: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
In an investigation of the firms’ practices and role in the financial crisis, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission determined that the complexity of the financial products the 
CRAs were rating had grown exponentially, in some cases beyond the firms’ abilities.  
Internal documents from the CRAs reflect inability and / or unwillingness to adapt to the 
volume and complexity of transactions occurring. 
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The aforementioned SEC report also comments at length on the conflicts of interest 
inherent in the “issuer pays” model.  Throughout their history, the CRAs have been paid 
fees by the agency issuing the security, which creates a conflict of interest between the 
issuer seeking a favorable rating on its product and the CRA responsible for providing the 
analysis.  Though regulations require the management staff negotiating fee structures to 
be different from the analysts providing the rating opinion, the SEC report noted that in 
fact this is often not the case, and that two of the three major CRAs maintained no active 
system for monitoring of the possible conflicts of interest.  Similarly, a report on the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers found that the organization had “market power” over the 
rating agencies because they issued so many MBSs.  Whereas in traditional bond ratings, 
where the agencies have thousands of clients—many corporations and municipalities 
issue bonds—in structured finance (the world of MBS, ABS, and CDOs) a few 
investment banks dominate. 
 
Another important element of the rating agency industry is that it is responsible for the 
definition of its ratings.  Institutional investors are committed to purchase only those 
securities with a certain minimum rating—but the very definition of AAA, or BB, or 
BBB is created by the rating agency.  This rating may or may not remain consistent 
within the agency from year to year, or between agencies, or between financial products.  
For instance, corporate bonds rated “Baa” by Moody’s had an average default percentage 
of 2.2 in 5-year periods from 1983 to 2005.  CDOs rated “Baa” by the same agency had 
an average default rate of 24 percent over 5-year periods in the same range.  Moreover, 
CDOs rated “Ba”—slightly worse, and the highest-rated non-investment grade—had an 
average default rate of 25.3% over the same period. 
 
In addition to playing the role of definer, the rating agencies also act as de facto regulator 
“in a market that has no official watchdogs” (Bloomberg).  However, that the firms are 
often viewed as regulators, definers, or authorities by the market does not mean that they 
share that opinion of their role.  Says a senior managing director at Moody’s: “many 
people have the tendency to rely on [our ratings], and we want to make sure that they 
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don't”.  S&P includes template language in its CDO ratings that instruct investors not to 
base any investment decisions on its analyses.   
 
The rating agencies consistently rated more and more MBS containing subprime 
mortgages in the years leading up to 2007.  According to data provided by Moody’s and 
S&P, subprime mortgage securities comprised approximately $100 Billion of the $375 
Billion of CDOs sold in the U.S. in 2006.  And their revenues have increased 
accordingly.  Because of the complexity of CDOs and asset-backed securities (ABS), the 
CRAs charge nearly three times as much to rate these financial products.  In the three 
years leading up to 2007, the CRAs made more money rating CDOs and ABSs than any 
other financial product—including corporate and municipal bonds.  In the case of Fitch, 
ratings of structure finance products accounted for more than half its total revenue in the 
year ending September 2006.  Moody’s tripled its profits in the years from 2002 to 2007. 
 
As subprime borrowers began to default and the questionable nature of the products 
became evident, the three largest CRAs downgraded more than 93% of all MBSs to junk 
status, devaluing the securities and forcing investors in turn to write down the value of 
the products.  In April 2007 Moody’s announced that the model it used since 2002 to 
evaluate the MBS it rated would be laid aside and a new model used.  The revelation that 
a model 5 years old had been used in a mortgage market changing daily stunned the 
structured finance world.  As defaults continued, the rating agencies began to downgrade 
MBS and CDO ratings in extreme quantity, often to levels multiple “notches” lower.  In 
the third quarter of 2007, the agencies downgraded $85 Billion in mortgage securities.  In 
the following three quarters the figure would increase: $237 Billion, $739 Billion, and 
$841 Billion.  First loss positions were immediately wiped out, and institutional investors 
who held CDOs had to write down extraordinary losses. 
 
This section of analysis seeks to analyze whether the events involving credit rating 
agencies in the years leading up to the 2007 were historically anomalous.  Unlike 
subprime lending and mortgage backed securities, considered elsewhere in this analysis, 
the history of credit rating agencies is not short: John Moody issued his first ratings 
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analysis of the railroad industry in 1909.  But the growth in securitization, and the 
demand for ratings of complex, multivariate MBS and CDO securities, was exponential 
and new to the agencies.  Along with this increased activity grew revenues and profits.  
Their ratings systems did not change, but the amount of subprime mortgage collateral 
comprising the securities they rated did.   
 
Part III: Causality 
The previous section of this analysis sought to understand to what extent, if any, the years 
leading up to the financial crisis were “historically anomalous” in the case of five 
separate commonly-blamed factors of the crisis.  This section speaks to causality, and 
how the above-described factors interacted to cause the current economic crisis. 
 
The most logical organization of causes and effects is chronological.  Of course defining 
cause and effect is often a never-ending cycle: if a baby knocks her milk off the tray in 
front of her, and it spills on the floor, do we blame the baby for knocking it over, the 
parent for putting it in front of her, the babysitter who purchased the milk, or the parent 
for bearing the child?  One must establish a starting point.  For the purposes of this 
analysis, given the five factors considered above, the starting point of analysis is the 
increased activity in residential construction—a macroeconomic factor.  Fueled by the 
low interest rates and times of general economic prosperity, commercial builders 
constructed record amounts of new homes, outstripping both the nation’s demand for new 
housing and the income capabilities of the average homebuyers. 
 
Perhaps the overbuilding in residential markets in the late 1990s and early 2000s would 
have subsided had it not been for the builders’ ability to sell the homes they were 
producing.  As noted above, the homeownership rate in the United States increased from 
approximately 64% to 69% in the 20 years between 1985 and 2005.  This extraordinary 
growth was fueled by several factors.  Firstly, the same relatively low interest rates which 
were encouraging builders to borrow to construct and businesses to borrow to expand 
were encouraging renters to buy and convert to homeownership.  Secondly, extraordinary 
growth in non-conforming mortgage products was allowing mortgage lenders to entice 
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households who had never before owned a home to do so.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
had, as noted above, cemented the income tax benefits of homeownership in lieu of 
renting, and additional financial, moral, and intellectual appeals in favor of 
homeownership were issued from the highest echelons of government.  Homeownership 
was and, to many remains, the American Dream.  Additionally, in the wake of substantial 
downturns in the stock market in the early 2000s as a result of the so-called “dot com” 
bust, homeownership—and homeownership related finance, as is considered next—was 
becoming increasingly viewed as a best possible investment alternative.  “We value your 
residency in Anaheim”, stated the Mayor of that City in his 2004 annual address, “and if 
you want to invest in your home, the government fees and government bureaucracy will 
not stand in the way of making your home into your dream home.” 
 
Whether mortgage lenders sought new buyers to fill the record number of homes being 
sold or buyers sought mortgage brokers to make a deal for them is a distinction to be 
considered in more detailed analyses.  There is evidence of both predatory lending and 
predatory borrowing.  But the conclusion noteworthy for this analysis is that lending did 
increase, at record rates.  The cause for this had much to do with the tremendous growth 
in securitization, which allowed lenders to rid their books of the loans they made often 
immediately after having made them.  The point that being able to sell a product for a 
profit immediately after buying it causes reduced incentive to properly value the product 
need not be labored.  Certainly, there existed requirements in such sales stipulating that if 
borrowers did not make payments within the first 60 days or even 6 months of a 
mortgage, the lenders would be required to repurchase the mortgage.  But many of the 
products sold were 30-year mortgages, a period of time far greater than the duration of 
the repurchase requirements.  And, more importantly, many of the products were 
affordable to borrowers in the early years, but had adjustable terms which would increase 
the burden, or necessitate refinancing, in later years, after repurchase requirements had 
expired. 
 
The extraordinary growth in securitization connected the subprime crisis to Wall Street, 
and specifically to mature investment houses with highly educated leadership and 
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extremely strong balance sheets.  Specifically, the growth in private label MBS, as 
opposed to the agency-issued securities, placed subprime assets in the coffers of many 
investors.  The modernization of the securities markets, growing from pass-through 
securities to MBS and CDOs, to CDOs2, which consisted of CDOs collateralizing other 
CDOs, introduced a level of systematic risk for which the securities holders were not 
properly compensated.  Losing market share, the GSEs would begin to dabble in 
subprime securitization, introducing toxic assets to their books.  Eventually, as their share 
prices fell and the threat of total collapse of the secondary housing markets loomed, the 
government would have to act on their implicit guarantee, furthering economists’ 
observations of moral hazard in the financial sector. 
 
Lastly, investors in securities relied on two fundamentals: that real estate was local and 
would never depress across the entire nation, and that rating agencies were conducting 
adequate due diligence on their behalf.  Muddying the understanding of securities by 
using the same rating scale and terminology used for traditional, single issue corporate 
and municipal bonds, rating agencies themselves failed to appreciate and highlight the 
very factors that made the multi-asset securities different from those traditional bonds: 
default commonality, credit enhancement, lack of historical comparability and data, and 
systematic risk.  Not since the 1930s had real estate values across the United States 
decreased so substantially.  The rating agency models failed to account for such a 
possibility.  Robert Rodriguez, Chief Executive Officer of First Pacific Advisors, recalls 
the following March 22 conversation with an analyst from Fitch which lays bare the 
rating agencies’ inability to predict this systematic, large scale asset devaluation: 
 
FPC: “What are the key drivers of your rating model?” 
Fitch: “FICO scores and home price appreciation of low single digit or mid single digit, 
as home price appreciation has been for the past 50 years.” 
FPC: “What if home price appreciation was flat for an extended period of time?” 
Fitch: “Our model would start to break down.” 
FPC: “What if home prices were to decline 1% to 2% for an extended period of time?” 
Fitch: “The models would break down completely.” 
FPC: “With 2% depreciation, how far up the rating’s scale would it harm?” 
Fitch: “It might go as high as the AA or AAA tranches.” 
 
  31
Thus, what began as an historically significant period of overbuilding provided shelter for 
a wave of new homeowners with complicated, atypical mortgages. As the asset bubble 
deflated, those atypical mortgages rocketed through the American financial system, 
affecting both private and public balance sheets, via risky securities not properly 
understood or valued by the various investors.  Lastly, through the inter-relatedness of the 
players in that financial system, the concept of “too big to fail” became a reality: if firm 
X fails, then all the debt firm X owes to firms Y, Z, and Q pulls them down too.  And as 
credit markets froze and dried—because no one would lend to X, Y, Z, or Q—the 
housing problem extended to other segments of industry and economics.   
 
 
Part IV: Conclusion  
As of the writing of this analysis, problems in multiple financial and economic sectors 
remain existent and unsolved.  There have been numerous bodies convened to examine 
the crisis, its causes, and possible solutions.  Perhaps the most prominent of these is the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, a ten-person bipartisan body established to 
investigate “the causes of the financial crisis that has gripped the economy”, and to report 
their findings to the Congress and the President.  (Their final report is due December 15, 
2010).  The FCIC is established by law and endowed with subpoena power which it has 
already used in soliciting information from an unresponsive rating agency.  Other 
government bodies and private organizations alike have formed committees and written 
“white papers” investigating particular aspects of the crisis.  Indeed, the topic is so broad 
and so multivariate that numerous articles and research papers have already been written 
on any number of the detailed variables or products described summarily in this 
document.  Some important factors which are the subject of public critique are not 
explored in this analysis, such as credit default swaps and over-the-counter derivatives; 
these are nonetheless important elements of an interconnected financial industry. 
 
The extent to which the FCIC, other bodies, and the general public will hold particular 
firms or individuals legally or morally accountable for what is ultimate determined to be 
erroneous or improper actions remains to be seen.  On April 17, 2010 the U.S. Securities 
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and Exchange Commission sued investment banking giant Goldman Sachs over what it 
claims to be improper structuring in the sale of a particular MBS product.  The outcome 
of that suit is unknown at this time.  Also unclear is the extent to which the government 
will continue its level of participation in and regulation of the housing and financial 
sectors.  As of the writing of this document, a financial reform bill, sponsored by 
Christopher Dodd (D-CT) is making its way through the U.S. Senate.  A summary 
provided on the Senate’s website notes that the bill will create a new “independent 
watchdog” agency within the Federal Reserve, “end too big to fail”, eliminate risky 
accounting loopholes, and provide shareholders with a say on executive compensation, 
among other objectives.  A comparable financial reform bill has already passed in the 
House. 
 
Whether a bill is passed, whether the Goldman suit or others like it are upheld, there is 
little doubt that many believe financial the industry is in need of at least greater oversight 
if not complete restructuring.  Based on the analysis presented above, a few 
recommendations for reform seem obvious.  Both the rating agencies and government 
sponsored enterprises suffer from poor business models.  In the case of the former, the 
“issuer pays” model provides far too substantial a conflict of interest.  The House reform 
bill mentioned above states: “The issuer-pay model has long created inherent conflicts of 
interest for which the [CRAs] have been criticized.”  Some sector analysts have 
suggested that one possible alternative is for issuers to the apply for a rating agency, 
which the SEC would then randomly assign.  Such a system is likely to have 
shortcomings of its own, but the overall objective to avoid the existent market power and 
collusion which dominates the I-Bank / CRA relationship is well founded.  The rating 
agencies and the SEC would also be wise to establish a new ratings scale for non-
traditional structured finance products which provides the definitions, gradations, and 
distinction which the complicated products require.  An AA-rated municipal bond and an 
AA-rated MBS tranche hardly carry the same level of risk; they should consequently 
have different monikers.   
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The idea of reform as relates to the five factors identified in this analysis is probably most 
controversial regarding the GSEs.  The benefit of the GSEs in providing liquidity to the 
mortgage markets is widely noted, as is their relative success and stability prior to “the 
whole subprime mess”.  Nonetheless, the GSEs by their very nature (prior to 
conservatorship) suffer from a basic business model problem: publically-mandated goals 
to be met through private business practices.  Simply put, the GSEs cannot be forced to 
maintain market share and produce (i.e. provide affordable homeownership 
opportunities) at a certain level while competing against private market players.  The 
public “mission” constrains their microeconomic alternatives.  The logical conclusion, 
then, appears to be either to abandon the public mission (privatize the GSEs) or abandon 
the private business practice (nationalize the GSEs).  Any middle ground will continue to 
hamper the GSEs in times of market expanse and give them unfair advantage in times of 
market decline. 
 
Reform in the MBS and the larger structured finance sector is likely the first which will 
occur.  Perhaps this is because Wall Street, with its multi-billion dollar profits and multi-
million dollar executive pay, makes for an easy target.  There has been much attention 
given the concept of “skin in the game”, or a requirement on MBS issuers to maintain a 
position within the issued securitization.  While this has some traction, it is worthwhile to 
note that many issuers did have “skin in the game” during financial crisis, and it is 
precisely for that reason, among others, that Wall Street choked on the toxic MBS and 
CDO products.  Other suggested reforms include caps on the amount of subprime 
mortgages which can be included in a particular securitization.  But this strategy has two 
main faults: firstly, as noted in the earliest segments of this analysis, “subprime” is not 
always easy to define.  Secondly, such regulations approach what many economists 
would agree is “market meddling”, a dangerous precedent for a free market economy.  
Instead, the most effective means of regulating investment banks and other structured 
finance players is likely to come in the way Wall Street always notices: profits.  Namely, 
in the few MBS issues which have come to market since the collapse, investors are 
beginning to demand that issuers defer a portion of their fee until a given level of payout 
is achieved on the investment.  Such manipulation of revenues, especially if conducted 
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industry-wide, is likely to incentivize issuers to maximize their own profits by 
aggregating products with a higher likelihood of continued payment. 
 
Though subprime lending has been perhaps the most identified of the factors in the crisis, 
reform of the component has been comparatively less considered.  Many market 
observers agree that repurchase agreements, by which the mortgage bankers are required 
to buy back mortgages from those packaging and selling them if they do not perform, 
should have longer terms.  Others have suggested caps on how much of a given mortgage 
bankers’ portfolio can be securitized—in essence requiring the lender to keep a portion of 
loans made on his balance sheet.  However this is likely simply to encourage the lender to 
keep those loans which he feels are likely to perform best, and sell the remainder.  Others 
have discussed the return to a system of interest rate caps and strict loan term 
requirements, but again such concepts become dangerous violations of the “free market 
economy” which many Americans hold dear.  Lastly, many fear that a return to strict “for 
prime” lending will in essence translate to “red lining”, the discriminatory practice in 
which lenders refuse to lend borrowers money or credit based on race, income, or other 
such factors. 
 
The only of the five factors considered in Part 2 (correlation) and not yet mentioned in 
this Part 4 is macroeconomic forces, which was ironically identified as the main causal 
factor in Part 3.  There has been limited discussion in media reports addressing potential 
reforms to some of the macroeconomic forces which contributed to the crisis.  Though 
public finance strategies such as the Federal Reserve’s management of interest rates and 
money supply and the government’s deficits and debts are widely reviewed and 
discussed, there has been little connection between these policies and the avoidance of 
future asset bubbles.  Nor has there been much suggestion that the microeconomic 
decision of homebuilders need to be better policed.  Perhaps the only “macroeconomic” 
factor which has received any considerable debate is homeownership, and 
homeownership rates.  Namely, some critics have called into question whether 
homeownership is truly the American Dream it has increasingly been portrayed to be, and 
whether the government should direct its efforts and financial assets to the betterment of 
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rental opportunities in lieu of, and not just in addition to, the creation of affordable 
homeownership opportunities. 
 
The above-listed reform suggestions are relatively substantial in scale, and would require 
the participation of many market players.  Many of the current reform suggestions 
meeting acceptance are relatively smaller in scale, but nonetheless practical and 
important.  Better disclosure will help all the players in the lending, securitization, and 
investment process to understand the underlying products and the due diligence 
conducted by their adjacent market players.  More accurate risk pricing methodologies 
will enable unsophisticated and / or risk-averse investors to avoid sophisticated financial 
products.  Safeguards and penalties for abuse and fraud will discourage predatory lending 
and borrower practices.  Additional regulatory oversight will increase the “eyes on the 
street”, to ensure those entities interacting with the public are doing so honestly and 
consistently. 
 
The intention of this analysis was, firstly, to determine the extent to which movements in 
five frequently blamed crisis factors were “historically anomalous”, that is, unusual 
compared against their own historical trends.  That part concluded that while the most 
recent housing “bubble” was in fact historically anomalous, the histories of subprime 
lending and securitization are too limited to make an effective comparison.  The actions 
of the GSEs and the rating agencies, however, did represent diversion from their 
historical precedents.  The second part of this analysis placed the five factors in 
sequential order so as to describe causality and thereby organize the crisis into causes and 
effects.  The final part provided a summary and a brief description and critique of current 
reform suggestions.   
 
One thing remains certain: the financial markets in the U.S and many nations across the 
globe have suffered unprecedented volatility and loss in the last several years.  A few 
“saw it coming”, but many, including the chiefs of government and private industry alike, 
did not.  To the extent this analysis aides current or future public and private leaders in 
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